This paper investigates the choice of a licensing mechanism by the holder of a patent whose validity is uncertain. Focusing …rst on weak patents, i.e. patents that have a high probability of being invalidated by a court if challenged, we show that the patent holder …nds it optimal to use a per-unit royalty contract if the strategic e¤ect of an increase in a potential licensee's unit cost on the equilibrium industry pro…t is positive. The latter condition ensures the superiority of the per-unit royalty mechanism independently of whether the patent holder is an industry insider or outsider, and is shown to hold in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous (resp. di¤erentiated) products under general assumptions on the demands faced by …rms. We then examine the optimal licensing of patents that are uncertain but not necessarily weak. As a byproduct of our analysis, we contribute to the oligopoly literature by o¤ering some new insights of independent interest regarding the e¤ects of cost variations on Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.
Introduction
Since the seminal contribution by Arrow (1962) , analyzing the licensing contracts whereby patent holders sell the right to use protected technologies has become an important topic in the economics of innovation and technology di¤usion. Arrow compared the revenues that an outside innovator obtains from licensing a cost-reducing innovation to a competitive industry and to a monopolistic industry.
He showed that when a per-unit royalty is charged, a perfectly competitive industry generates higher licensing revenues than a monopolistic one. 1 Subsequently, Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986) analyzed di¤erent licensing mechanisms (…xed fee, auction and per-unit royalty) when the potential licensees are members of an oligopoly. A key insight of the theoretical literature that has built on those seminal papers is that the optimal licensing mechanism depends on many factors, including the type of downstream competition, the degree of di¤erentiation between products and whether the patent holder is active or not in the downstream market. 2 These three factors have been shown to be critical in the sense that predictions regarding the optimal mechanism can be completely overturned by varying any of them. 3 A common feature of the existing papers on the comparison of di¤erent licensing mechanisms is that patents are viewed as certain or "ironclad" rights, the validity of which is unquestionable.
This clearly contradicts what we observe in practice: about half of the patents that are challenged before US courts are invalidated (Allison & Lemley, 1998) . 4 It is now largely recognized that a patent is not a perfectly enforceable right, as are other forms of property. Patents correspond much more to "uncertain or probabilistic rights because they only give a limited right to try to exclude by asserting the patent in court" (Ayres and Klemperer, 1999; Shapiro, 2003; Lemley and Shapiro, 2005) . Moreover, this uncertainty is strengthened by the fact that many applications are granted patent protection by the patent o¢ ce (PO) even though they probably do not meet one or several of the statutory requirements: belonging to the patentable subject matters, utility, novelty and nonobviousness (or inventiveness). Such patents are weak in the sense that they have a high probabilty of being invalidated by a court if challenged by a third party. 5 1 This is a consequence of the well known replacement e¤ ect, according to which the willingness to pay for an innovation is larger for an entrant in a competitive industry than for an incumbent …rm.
2 Empirically, royalties seem to be more often used than …xed fees (Taylor and Silberstone, 1973; Rostoker, 1984) . However, available data on patent licensing is very limited, because most …rms elect not to disclose their private licensing contracts. Most empirical investigations emphasize the factors that a¤ect the likelihood of …rms to engage in licensing agreements but are less informative on the licensing scheme (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Vonortas and Kim, 2004, Zuniga and Guellec, 2009 ) 3 For instance, it has been shown that under Cournot competition with homogeneous products, …xed fees dominate per-unit royalties when the licensor is an industry outsider (Kamien and Tauman, 1984, 1986; Kamien et al., 1992) . However, the reverse result holds if the licensor is an industry insider (Shapiro, 1985; Wang, 1998; Kamien and Tauman, 2002; Sen, 2002; Sen and Tauman, 2007, 2012) . Furthermore, under price competition with di¤erentiated products, per-unit royalties dominate …xed fees when the products are close substitutes or, if not, when the size of the cost reduction is small, while the reverse holds if the products are weak substitutes and the innovation is large (Muto, 1993) . The results are quite di¤erent if one considers the same di¤erentiated product environment but assumes that …rms compete in quantities instead of prices (Wang, 2002) . 4 This concerns the patent disputes that are not settled prior to the court judgement. 5 The notion of "weak patent" has at least two di¤erent meanings in the literature (Ginarte and Park, 1997, van The proliferation of uncertain patents can be explained by several reasons. First, the major patent o¢ ces (USPTO, EPO and JPO) have insu¢ cient resources to ensure an e¤ective review process for the huge and growing number of patent applications (Friebel et al., 2006) . Second, mistakes are unavoidable because the patentability requirements, in particular novelty and non-obviousness, are di¢ cult to assess especially for newly patentable subject matters, such as software, business methods and research tools. Third, the incentives provided to the examiners are inadequate for making them fully prosecute and reject the applications that do not meet the standards (Farrell and Merges, 2004; Langinier and Marcoul, 2009; Lei and Wright, 2010) . Finally, the continuing debate on what subject matters are patentable throws additional uncertainty into the validity of many patents (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2007) .
In this paper we investigate the optimal licensing mechanism from the perspective of a licensor holding an uncertain patent and facing the threat of patent litigation. We thus extend three strands of literature:
1. The vast literature that compares various licensing mechanisms in the context of ironclad patents. 6 Our contribution is to extend this comparison to patents whose validity is uncertain.
We believe that such an extension is warranted in light of the growing proliferation of uncertain patents and, in particular, weak ones. 7 We thus investigate …rst the case of weak patents and provide a su¢ cient condition under which the holders of such patents prefer to charge a per unit royalty rather than a …xed fee. 8 This condition has a very natural economic interpretation: it states that the strategic e¤ect of an increase in an oligopolist's unit cost on industry pro…ts is positive. This result is very general since the type of competition between the potential users of the technology is not speci…ed in our model except for assuming the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium to the competition game and some properties that are shown to be broadly satis…ed in usual imperfect competition models. Then we show that the su¢ cient condition above holds and, therefore the per-unit royalty mechanism is optimal from the patent holder's perspective, in a wide range of settings. 9 A key di¤erence with the literature considering ironclad patents is that the superiority Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2010) . First, a patent can be said to be weak if it gives its holder a low protection against imitators and other potential infringers, either because the patent's scope is badly de…ned or because the protection extends to countries in which the enforcement of intellectual property rights is low. Second, a patent can be quali…ed as weak when it is likely that it does not satisfy at least one of the patentability requirements (patentable subject matter, utility, novelty, non obviousness or inventiveness in the European terminology). In this sense, a weak patent is likely to be invalidated by a court if challenged by a third party. The present paper focuses on the latter meaning. 6 See Bhattacharya et al. (2012) for a recent survey on the licensing of ironclad patents and other R&D arrangements. 7 Bessen and Meurer (2008) argue that the inclusion of software and business methods in the patentable subject matters in the US has resulted in an increase in the share of weak patents among all the patents issued by the USPTO.
of per-unit royalties for the licensing of weak patents is a very robust result: it is independent of the type of downstream competition, the degree of di¤erentiation between products and whether the patent holder is active or not in the downstream market. We then extend our analysis to the licensing of patents that are uncertain, but not necessarily weak, and show that our …nding about the optimality of the per-unit royalty mechanism may hold even for patents that have a relatively low probability of being invalidated by a court if challenged.
2. The burgeoning literature on the licensing of uncertain patents (Farrell and Shapiro, 2008; Encaoua and Lefouili, 2005, 2009; Choi 2010) . This literature has been mostly concerned with the ine¢ ciencies stemming from the low private incentives to litigate a weak patent. The social harm of weak patents also depends on how they are licensed out and, therefore, we argue that it is crucial to get a better understanding of the licensing schemes the holders of those problematic patents use.
In Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009) , the licensor is assumed to o¤er twopart tari¤ licensing contracts. However, when considering the e¤ects of the uncertainty over patent validity on the licensor's pro…ts and/or social welfare when negative …xed fees cannot be used, each of these two papers relies on a technical ad hoc assumption on the shape of the (endogenous) licensing revenue function 10 that substantially simpli…es the analysis by immediately guaranteeing that pure per-unit royalty contracts are optimal for the licensors of weak patents in the class of contracts deterring litigation. In sharp contrast to the former papers, our result that the holder of a weak patent …nds it optimal to use a per-unit licensing contract is implied by a mild condition which has a natural economic interpretation and is shown to hold with broad generality in standard oligopoly models with general demand functions (as are all the assumptions made in our model). This …nding is therefore arguably robust, especially as it is shown to hold as well in various extensions of our baseline model. Furthermore, we show that a social planner always prefers the license of an uncertain patent deterring litigation to take the form of a …xed fee contract, which implies that the holder of a weak patent chooses a socially suboptimal licensing mechanism. A policy implication is that welfare gains may be realized by encouraging or constraining the holders of weak patents to license them by means of …xed fees.
3. The extensive literature on oligopoly. We contribute to this literature by providing new insights regarding the e¤ects of cost variations on oligopolists' pro…ts (Seade, 1985; Kimmel, 1992; Février and Linnemer, 2004) . Since our result that the licensor of a weak patent …nds it optimal to use a per-unit royalty contract, holds whenever the strategic e¤ect of a unilateral cost increase on industry pro…ts is positive, we examine the latter condition and show that it holds (i) for Cournot competition with homogeneous products under complete generality, and (ii) for Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products under strategic complementarity. In other words, no restrictions on the demand systems are needed beyond those commonly invoked to establish existence and uniqueness of innovation (Rockett, 1990) .
1 0 Farrell and Shapiro (2008) assume that the licensing revenue function where the …xed fee is set to its optimal level (for a given per-unit royalty) is single-peaked in the per-unit royalty while Encaoua and Lefouili (2009) assume that the same function is concave in the per-unit royalty (see assumption A6 in their paper). a pure-strategy equilibrium. An ancillary result is that we provide a lower bound on the e¤ect of a unilateral cost increase on industry pro…ts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the optimal per-unit royalty (resp. …xed fee) license from the patent holder's perspective.
In Section 4 we compare the two licensing mechanisms for weak patents. In Section 5, we extend the analysis by successively (i) including (small) litigation costs, (ii) allowing the patent holder to o¤er two-part tari¤ licensing contracts, and (iii) considering a patent holder that is an industry insider. In Section 6, we show that the general assumptions made on the equilibrium pro…ts in our reduced-form model of competition and the (su¢ cient) condition under which the per-unit royalty mechanism is optimal to the patent holder (be it an industry outsider or an insider) hold under general conditions on the demand functions for both a Cournot oligopoly with homogenous goods and a Bertrand oligopoly with di¤erentiated goods. In Section 7, we extend our analysis to uncertain patents of any strength. Welfare implications are discussed in Section 8. Section 9 concludes.
The Model
We consider an industry consisting of n 2 symmetric risk-neutral …rms producing at a marginal cost c (…xed production costs are assumed to be zero). A …rm P outside the industry holds a patent covering a technology that, if used, allows a …rm to reduce its marginal cost from c to c where
We consider the following three-stage game:
First stage: The patent holder P proposes to all …rms a licensing contract 11 whereby a licensee can use the patented technology against the payment of a per-unit royalty r 2 [0; ] or a …xed fee
Second stage: The n …rms in the industry simultaneously and independently decide whether to purchase a license. If a …rm does not accept the license o¤er, it can challenge the patent's validity before a court. 13 The outcome of such a trial is uncertain: with probability > 0 the patent is upheld by the court and with probability 1 it is invalidated. Hence, the parameter may be interpreted as the patent's quality or the patent's strength. If the patent is upheld, then a …rm that does not purchase the license uses the old technology, thus producing at marginal cost c whereas a …rm that accepted the license o¤er uses the new technology and pay the per-unit royalty r or the …xed fee F to the patent holder. If the patent is invalidated, all the …rms, including those that accepted the license o¤er can use for free the new technology and their common marginal cost is c .
1 1 Following Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009), we focus on take-it-or-leave-it license o¤ers. 1 2 In Section 5.2, we show that allowing the patent holder to o¤er two-part tari¤ contracts does not a¤ect our central result.
1 3 For patents granted by the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO), the timing is slightly di¤erent. Indeed, any patent issued by the EPO can be opposed by a third party and the notice of opposition must be …led in writing at the EPO within nine months from the publication of the mention of the grant of the European patent.
Third stage: The n …rms produce under the cost structure inherited from the second stage. We do not specify the type of competition that occurs. We only assume that there exists a unique equilibrium of the competition game for any cost structure and we set some general assumptions on the equilibrium pro…t functions. 14 For this purpose, denote e (k; c) (respectively i (k; c)) the equilibrium pro…t function, gross of any potential …xed cost, e.g. a …xed license fee, of a …rm producing with marginal cost c c (respectively with marginal cost c) when k n …rms produce at marginal cost c and the remaining n k …rms produce at the marginal cost c:
We now make the following general assumptions for any given n and k = 1; :::; n:
A1. The equilibrium pro…ts of an e¢ cient …rm and an ine¢ cient …rm, i.e. e (k; c) and i (k; c) respectively, are both continuously di¤erentiable in c over the subset of [0; c] in which i (k; c) > 0:
Furthermore, the output function c ! q e (n; c) when the n …rms produce at marginal cost c is continuously di¤erentiable and strictly positive over [0; c].
A2
. If the …rms are symmetric (in terms of e¢ ciency), an identical increase in all …rms' marginal costs leads to a decrease in each …rm's equilibrium pro…t:
A3. An ine¢ cient …rm's equilibrium pro…t is increasing in the e¢ cient …rms' marginal cost:
. A …rm's pro…t is decreasing in the number of e¢ cient …rms in the industry: for any c < c and any k < n it holds that e (k; c) > e (k + 1; c) and
A5. A …rm's pro…t increases as it moves from the subgroup of ine¢ cient …rms to the subgroup of e¢ cient …rms: for any c < c and any k < n it holds that i (k; c) < e (k + 1; c):
As we shall argue in precise detail in Section 6, all these assumptions are satis…ed with broad generality in the standard oligopoly models with general demand functions. In particular, these assumptions are clearly satis…ed for instance for the widely used settings of Cournot competition with homogeneous goods and linear demand and Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated goods and linear demands.
Licenses deterring litigation
If litigation occurs then, with probability , the patent is upheld by the court (thus becoming an ironclad right) and, with probability 1 ; it is invalidated and the technology can be used for free by all …rms. Thus, if the patent holder expects its license o¤er to trigger litigation, it should make an o¤er that maximizes its revenues should the patent be ruled valid by the court. The patent holder would then essentially act as if the patent were ironclad, and the determination of the terms on which the technology is patented under each licensing mechanism would amount to the analysis of licensing o¤ers for ironclad patents, which has already been done extensively in the literature. Assume that the patent holder makes a license o¤er (in the …rst stage) involving the payment of a per-unit royalty r < : Let us show that in this case, any outcome with k n 2 licensees cannot be an equilibrium. We have already shown that a situation where not all …rms buy a license and no …rm challenges the patent cannot be an equilibrium so we can focus on situations with k n 2 licensees and at least one non-licensee challenging the patent. Any of the other n k 1 1 nonlicensees has an incentive to unilaterally deviate by buying a license since it would get an expected pro…t of e (k + 1; c + r) + (1 ) e (n; c ) instead of the strictly lower expected pro…t i (k; c + r) + (1 ) e (n; c ) if it remains a non-licensee. Therefore, any equilibrium of the second stage subgame involves at least n 1 …rms if r < . The latter result extends to the case r = if it is assumed, as will be the case from now on, that a …rm which is indi¤erent between getting a license and not buying a license purchases a license.
Let us now write the condition under which all …rms accepting the license o¤er r is an equilibrium of the second stage subgame. A …rm anticipating that all other …rms will purchase a license gets a pro…t equal to e (n; c + r) if it accepts the license o¤er. If it does not and challenges the patent's validity then with probability ; the patent is upheld by the court and the challenger gets a pro…t equal to i (n 1; c + r) and, with probability 1 , the challenger gets a pro…t of e (n; c )
(and so do all other …rms). Thus, a …rm challenging the patent's validity when all other …rms accept the license o¤er, gets an expected pro…t of i (n 1; c + r) + (1 ) e (n; c ): Therefore, all …rms accepting the license o¤er is an equilibrium if and only if:
The next proposition characterizes the values of the per-unit royalty set by the licensor that induce all …rms to buy a license (thus deterring any litigation).
Proposition 1 De…ne r ( ) as the unique solution in r to the following equation:
Then all …rms accepting to pay a per-unit royalty r is an equilibrium if and and only if r r ( ) :
Moreover, this is the unique equilibrium of the second stage subgame when r r ( ) :
Proof. See Appendix.
Fixed fee mechanism
The previous observation that a license o¤er deters litigation if and only if it is accepted by all …rms remains true when the licensor uses a …xed fee scheme. For a license o¤er involving the payment of a …xed fee F to be accepted by all …rms, the following condition must hold:
which can be rewritten as:
The next proposition is the counterpart of Proposition 1 for the …xed fee mechanism.
Proposition 2 All …rms accepting to pay the …xed fee F to use the patented technology is an equilibrium if and only if F F ( ) = [ e (n; c ) i (n 1; c )]: Moreover, for su¢ ciently weak patents, i.e. for su¢ ciently small values of , all …rms accepting the license o¤ er is the unique equilibrium
Optimal licensing of weak patents under each mechanism
The patent holder's licensing revenues are given by nrq e (n; c ) if a per-unit royalty contract is used and by nF if the contract takes the form of a …xed fee payment. The next proposition characterizes the license that maximizes the patent holder's revenues subject to the constraint that no …rm challenges the patent's validity.
Proposition 3 For su¢ ciently weak patents, the optimal per-unit royalty license deterring litigation involves the payment of the royalty rate r = r ( ) and the optimal …xed fee license deterring litigation is such that F = F ( ).
Optimal licensing mechanism for weak patents
The licensing revenues from the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litigation are given bỹ
and the licensing revenues from the optimal …xed fee licensing contract deterring litigation arẽ
which, combined with e (n; c + r ( )) = i (n 1; c + r ( )) + (1 ) e (n; c ), yields
and
The term A( ) is the di¤erence between the industry pro…ts generated under the optimal per-unit royalty contract and those under the optimal …xed fee contract. The term B( ), which is always non-positive 16 , captures the fact that a potential licensee's outside option (when all other …rms buy a license) is weakly higher under the per-unit royalty contract: in the event where the patent is invalidated, a challenger gets the same pro…t e (n; c ) under both mechanisms, but in the event where the patent is upheld the challenger's pro…t is weakly higher under the per-unit royalty mechanism since i (n 1; c + r ( )) i (n 1; c ) by A3. The latter implies that each licensee gets a higher pro…t under the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litigation than under its …xed fee counterpart. A corollary of this observation is that a necessary condition for the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litigation to be preferred over its …xed fee counterpart by the patent holder is that it generates (weakly) higher industry pro…ts. It turns out that this condition, 1 6 Two scenarios have to be distinguished according to whether the set c 0 > c ; i (n 1; c 0 ) = 0 is empty or not. If it is then i (n 1; c + r( )) > i (n 1; c ) for any > 0, and therefore B( ) > 0 for any > 0: If it is not then it is easily shown that there exists 0 > 0 such that i (n 1; c + r( )) = i (n 1; c ) = 0 for 0 and i (n 1; c + r( )) > i (n 1; c ) for > 0 by A3. It then follows that B( ) 0 with the inequality being strict if and only if > 0.
when taken as a strict inequality, is actually su¢ cient when the patent is su¢ ciently weak. The reason for this is that B( ) is, at most, a second-order term for su¢ ciently small (since B(0) = 0 and B 0 (0) = 0) while A( ) is generally a …rst-order term. Therefore, for su¢ ciently small, the sign ofP r ( ) P F ( ) will be the same as A( ) whenever A 0 (0) 6 = 0. In words, the holder of a (su¢ ciently) weak patent will …nd it optimal to choose the licensing mechanism that maximizes industry pro…ts under the constraint that all …rms accept the license o¤er. The next proposition provides a su¢ cient condition for the per-unit royalty mechanism to be preferred over the …xed fee mechanism by the holder of a (su¢ ciently) weak patent.
Proposition 4 For a su¢ ciently weak patent, the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litigation provides higher licensing revenues than the optimal …xed fee contract deterring litigation if
Moreover, the reverse holds if the reverse strict inequality is satis…ed.
Condition ( @ e @c (n; c) = q e (n; c) | {z } direct ef f ect + q e (n; c) @p e @c (n; c) + (p e (n; c) c) @q e @c (n; c)
An increase in all …rms'marginal cost c a¤ects their equilibrium pro…ts e (n; c) through two channels.
First, it yields an increase in each …rm's production costs (for a given output). Second, it entails an adjustment of their outputs and/or prices. The …rst e¤ect, captured by the term q e (n; c); can be interpreted as a direct e¤ect of a common cost increase on equilibrium pro…ts while the second e¤ect, captured by the term q e (n; c) @p e @c (n; c) + (p e (n; c) c) @q e @c (n; c), can be interpreted as the strategic e¤ect of a cost increase on pro…ts. 18 To the best of our knowledge, Condition (3) has not been studied in the literature on the e¤ects of cost variations on oligopolists'pro…ts which has mainly focused on the overall e¤ect of cost changes on pro…ts (e.g. Seade, 1985 , Kimmel, 1992 Février and Linnemer 2004) . In Section 6 we show the mildness of this condition by establishing that it holds under general assumptions in two of the 1 7 Another interpretation of this condition can be given in terms of the Lerner index. The condition holds i¤ the Lerner index is below the ratio of the price and quantity elasticities with respect to marginal cost.
1 8 This strategic e¤ect can be further split into a price e¤ ect captured by the term q e (n; c) @p e @c (n; c) and an output e¤ ect captured by the term (p e (n; c) c) @q e @c (n; c) : In usual models of competition, the latter is negative while the former is positive. Therefore the strategic e¤ect is positive if the price e¤ect outweighs the output e¤ect.
most usual competition models, namely Cournot competition with homogenous goods and Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated goods.
Extensions

Litigation costs
Let us assume in this section that a …rm that challenges the patent's validity before a court has to incur some legal costs C 0. 19 It is straightforward that the higher those costs the higher the licensing revenues the patent holder can extract from the licensees without triggering litigation. This qualitative observation holds under both mechanism. However, we show in what follows that on the quantitative side, the marginal e¤ect of litigation costs on the patent holder's licensing revenues is higher under the per-unit royalty mechanism than under the …xed fee mechanism if condition (3) holds. This implies that the result in Proposition 4 remains true -and is actually strenghtened -if the model is extended to include (small) legal costs that any challenger must incur.
Suppose …rst that the patent holder makes a license o¤er involving the payment of a per-unit royalty r 2 [0; [ . Note that the inclusion of legal costs in our setting does not a¤ect the fact that the strategy "not buy a license and not challenge the patent's validity" is always dominated by the strategy "buy a license". Therefore, the only way a patent holder can deter litigation is to make a license o¤er that is accepted by all …rms. This will be the case if and only if
It is easily shown the latter constraint is met if and only if r r( ; C) where r( ; C) is the solution in r to the equation
and that, for and C su¢ ciently small, the optimal per-unit royalty license deterring litigation involves the payment of the royalty r( ; C) (i.e. the constraint is binding). Note also that r( ; C) is strictly increasing in both its arguments.
Suppose now that the patent holder makes a license o¤er involving the payment of a …xed fee F:
Such a license o¤er is accepted by all …rms if and only if
and, therefore, the optimal …xed fee license deterring litigation involves the payment of the fee
Let us now compare the licensing revenues derived by the patent holder under the two mechanisms.
Under the optimal per-unit royalty contract, they are given bỹ P r ( ; C) = nr ( ; C) q e (n; c + r ( ; C)) and under the optimal …xed fee contract, they are given bỹ
SinceP r (0; 0) =P F (0; 0) ; a su¢ cient condition for the existence of~ > 0 andC > 0 such that the inequalityP r ( ; C) >P F ( ; C) holds for any <~ and C <C is that
The former inequality has already been shown to be equivalent to condition (3). Surprisingly enough, the latter inequality is equivalent to condition (3) too. Indeed,
Di¤erentiating with respect to C the equation de…ning r ( ; C) at point ( ; C) = (0; 0) ; we get:
: Thus,
Therefore, the result in Proposition 4 is robust -and is actually strengthened -in the presence of relatively small legal costs.
Two-part tari¤ contracts
Assume in this section that the patent holder can o¤er a two-part tari¤ licensing contract involving the payment of a …xed fee F 0 and a per-unit royalty r 0. The optimal two-part tari¤ contract F ( ) ;r ( ) deterring litigation is a solution to the following maximization program
Since the objective function is increasing in F , the constraint has to be binding at the optimum.
Therefore, the optimal two-part tari¤ contract F ( ) ;r ( ) is such thatF ( ) = e (n; c +r ( )) i (n 1; c +r ( )) (1 ) e (n; c ) andr ( ) is a solution to
Note that the latter constraint could be rewritten as r r ( ), and thatF ( ) = 0 if and only if r ( ) = r ( ), i.e. the constraint is binding. The next proposition shows that our main …nding, i.e. that the holder of a su¢ ciently weak patent …nds it optimal to use a per-unit royalty contract whenever Condition (3) holds, extends to a setting where the larger set of two-part tari¤ contracts is considered.
Proposition 5 For su¢ ciently weak patents, the optimal two-part tari¤ licensing contract deterring litigation is a pure per-unit royalty contract if:
Internal patentee
Let us consider the case where the patent holder is active in the (downstream) market. More speci…cally, we assume that one of the n …rms operating in the market, say …rm 1, gets a patent on a technology that lowers the unit production cost from c to c : We assume that n 3 (as we want to have at least two potential licensees).
Here again, we assume that there exists a unique equilibrium of the competition game for any cost structure (with identical pro…ts for …rms producing at the same unit cost) and we set some general assumptions on the equilibrium pro…t functions. We focus on industry cost structures that can emerge following the licensing game, that is, situations in which: one …rm -the patent holder -produces at unit cost c , a number k n 1 of …rms -the licensees -produce at a unit cost c 2 [ c ; c] and the remaining n k …rms -the non-licensees -produce at unit cost c: We denote by p (k; c), l (k; c) and n (k; c) the equilibrium market pro…ts of the patent holder, a licensee producing at an e¤ective unit cost c and a non-licensee respectively.
Given the new environment we consider, we need to replace the assumptions A1-A5 made in our baseline model with the following assumptions:
A1' . The equilibrium pro…ts p (k; c), l (k; c) and n (k; c) are continuously di¤erentiable in c over [0; c] over the subset of [0; c] in which n (c; k) > 0: Furthermore, the function c ! q l (n; c) is continuously di¤erentiable over the subset of [0; c] in which it is strictly positive.
A2
' . An identical increase in the costs of all …rms but the patent holder decreases each one of those …rms'equilibrium pro…t:
A non-licensee's equilibrium pro…t is increasing in the licensees'unit cost: If n (k; c) > 0 then @ n @c (k; c) > 0 and if n (k; c) = 0 then n (k; c 0 ) = 0 for any c 0 < c: A4' . A …rm's market pro…t is decreasing in the number of licensees in the industry: for any c < c and any
A5' . A …rm's market pro…t increases as it moves from the subgroup of non-licensees to the subgroup of licensees: for any c < c and any k < n 1 it holds that n (k; c) < l (k + 1; c):
The comparison of the innovator's overall pro…t, i.e. the sum of its market pro…t and licensing revenues, under the two licensing mechanisms,yields the following result:
Proposition 6 For su¢ ciently weak patents, the optimal per-unit royalty contract deterring litigation generates higher overall pro…t for the patent holder than its …xed fee counterpart if
Proof. See Appendix. To see how Condition (4) compares to its counterpart when the patent holder is not active on the market, i.e. Condition (3), let us rewrite both of them with the same notations. For that purpose, let us denote by (c 1 ; c 2 ; :::; c n ) the sum of all …rms'equilibrium market pro…ts, i.e. the equilibrium (downstream) industry pro…t, and q i (c 1 ; c 2 ; :::; c n ) …rm i's output when each …rm j = 1; 2; :::; n produces at unit cost c j :
The su¢ cient condition for a patent holder who is an industry outsider to prefer the per-unit royalty mechanism for su¢ ciently weak patents can be rewritten as (replacing c with the generic variable c): 
The su¢ cient condition for a patent holder who is an industry insider to prefer the per-unit royalty mechanism for su¢ ciently weak patents can be rewritten as (replacing again c by the generic variable c, and denoting P the patent holder):
q i (c; c; :::; c) :
The two inequalities have very close interpertations: Condition (5) means that the strategic e¤ect of an identical increase in all …rms'(common) unit cost on the industry pro…t is positive and Condition (6) means that the strategic e¤ect of an increase in the costs of all …rms but one on the industry pro…ts is positive (…rms being equally e¢ cient initially). Note also that both conditions are implied by the following inequality when it holds for any i = 1; 2; :::; n : @ @c i (c; c; :::; c) > q i (c; c; :::; c) :
This condition means that when …rms are equally e¢ cient initially, the strategic e¤ect of an increase in one …rm's unit cost on the aggregate pro…t is positive.
We show in the next section that Condition (7) holds (i) for Cournot competition with homogeneous products under complete generality, and (ii) for Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products under strategic complementarity, provided existence an uniqueness of a pure-strategy equilibrium holds in these two environments. It then follows that both Condition (5) and Condition (6) hold since they are implied by Condition (7).
Two standard oligopoly applications
In this section, we provide su¢ cient conditions of a general nature on the primitives of the two most widely used models of imperfect competition, which lead to Assumptions A1-A5 and A1' -A5'and Condition (7) being veri…ed. Since some of the results below are new to the oligopoly literature, and of some independent interest, we derive them for fully asymmetric versions of the Cournot and
Bertrand oligopolies with linear costs. Accordingly, we also change the notation as needed, relative to the other parts of the paper.
Cournot competition with homogeneous products
Consider an industry consisting of n …rms competing in Cournot fashion. Firm i's marginal cost is denoted c i (…xed production costs are assumed to be zero or otherwise sunk). Suppose the …rms face an inverse demand function P ( ) satisfying the following minimal conditions:
C1 P ( ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and P 0 ( ) < 0 whenever P ( ) > 0:
for Q su¢ ciently high, i = 1; 2; :::; n.
These assumptions are quite standard. C3 is the familiar condition used by Novshek (1985) to guarantee downward-sloping reaction curves (for any cost function). It is equivalent to the statement that each …rm's marginal revenue is decreasing in rivals'output (see Amir, 1996 for an alternative condition).
Firm i's pro…t function and reaction correspondence are (here,
The next proposition provides general conditions under which Assumptions A1-A5 and A1' -A5'
hold for a Cournot oligopoly.
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions C1-C3, the following holds: (a) There exists a unique Cournot equilibrium.
(b) Firm i's equilibrium pro…t i is di¤ erentiable in c i and in c j for any j 6 = i:
(c) Firm i's equilibrium pro…t i is decreasing in c i and increasing in c j for any j 6 = i:
If in addition, the game is symmetric (with c denoting the unit cost), then (d) The unique Cournot equilibrium is symmetric.
(e) The equilibrium output q strictly decreases in c.
(f ) Per-…rm equilibrium pro…t decreases in c:
Proof. See Appendix. It is straightforward to relate the di¤erent parts of Proposition 7 to Assumptions A1-A5 and A1' -A5' . Part (a) is needed to avoid vacuous statements. Assumptions A1 and A1'are implied by part (b) and the proof of part (e). Assumption A2 follows from part (f) and Assumption A2'
follows from combining part (f) with part (c). Assumptions A3 and A3' are implied by part (c).
Assumptions A4 and A4' follow from repeated applications of part (c), with one rival …rm's cost decreasing at a time. Assumptions A5 and A5'follow from part (c).
We now discuss the scope of these assumptions, focusing on parts (f) and (c), the other assumptions being well known for existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium. Though intuitive, part (f) actually has a less universal scope than one might think. Indeed, there is an extensive literature dealing with taxation in oligopolistic industries and one of its key insights is that a common cost increase can lead to some …rms bene…ting at the expense of others (Seade, 1985 , Kimmel, 1992 , and Février and Linnemer, 2004 . More surprisingly, in a symmetric setting, a cost increase may be bene…cial to all …rms, when the inverse demand function is su¢ ciently convex. In light of this result, part (f) may be viewed as giving su¢ cient conditions for this counter-intuitive e¤ect of taxation not to arise.
Since the cost paradox literature considers cost increases that are common to all …rms, it does not deal directly with the pro…t e¤ects of a unilateral cost change, as in the results of part (c).
Nevertheless, in light of the cost paradox, it is intuitive that the intuitive …ndings of part (c) need not hold for su¢ ciently convex inverse demand functions, as is con…med via an example below. In light of this discussion, it emerges that ruling out the cost paradox and its plausible implications is one of the most restrictive requirements of the present setting. All in all, Assumption C3 is then clearly appropriate here since it guarantees both the existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium (with constant unit costs) and the abscence of the cost paradox. 20
As an instructive illustration, we provide a class of convex (hyperbolic) demand functions that violates C3.
Example. Consider a duopoly industry with an iso-elastic inverse demand function, P (Q) = Q 1=b , 1 2 < b < 1, which clearly fails assumption C3. The pro…t functions are i (q i ; q j ) = [(q i + q j ) 1=b c i ]q i . The equilibrium outputs and pro…ts are, with i; j 2 f1; 2g ; i 6 = j;
It is easily veri…ed that, in violation of our basic assumptions A2 -A5,
> 0 for some values of the parameters. In particular
for some values of the parameters.
(iii) In the n-…rm symmetric version of this example, @ @c > 0 (see Kimmel, 1992, and Février and Linnemer, 2004) .
Note that the above counter-intuitive results pertain to the unique interior Cournot equilibrium.
Indeed, this example gives rise to two Cournot equilibria, one of which has each …rm producing zero output.
As illustrated by this simple example, an insightful perspective on Proposition 7 is that, by imposing one of the commonly used conditions to guarantee existence of Cournot equilibrium via the property of strategic substitutes (Novshek, 1985 and Amir, 1996) , namely C3, one also obtains as a byproduct that the counter-intuitive results on the e¤ects of uniform or unilateral cost increases (or uniform or individual taxation) on …rms'pro…ts do not hold.
Proposition 8 Under Assumptions C1-C3, Condition (7) is veri…ed.
As can easily be seen in the proof, this result actually only requires that total equilibrium output decreases with a unilateral unit cost increase, which holds universally in Cournot competition with linear costs. Note also that this result provides a lower bound on the e¤ect of a unilateral cost increase on industry pro…ts, an issue not considered in the related literature.
Thus, we can conclude that under the general assumptions C1-C3, the holder of a weak patent …nds it optimal to license it out using a per-unit royalty licensing contract. This result holds whether the patent holder is active in the (downstream) market or not.
Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products
Consider an industry consisting of n single-product …rms, with constant unit costs c 1 ; c 2 ; :::; c n : Assume that the goods are imperfect substitutes. Denoting D i (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ) the demand for the good produced by …rm i; its pro…t function and reaction correspondence are de…ned as usual by
We will say that the Bertrand oligopoly is symmetric if the demand functions are symmetric and
Let S i , (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ) 2 R n + j D i (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ) > 0 . We assume throughout that for every …rm i:
> 0 over the set S i , for j 6 = i.
These conditions are quite general, and are commonly invoked for di¤erentiated-good demand systems. They have the following meanings and economic interpretations. For B2, part (i) is just the ordinary law of demand; part (ii) says that goods i and j are substitutes; and part (iii) is a dominant diagonal condition for the Jacobian of the demand system, which is required to hold only at equal prices (see e.g., Vives, 1999). It says that, along the diagonal, own price e¤ect on demand exceeds the total cross-price e¤ects. B3 says that each demand has (di¤erentiably) strict log-increasing di¤erences in own price and any rival's price. The exact economic interpretation is that the price elasticity of demand strictly increases in any rival's price, which is a very natural assumption (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) . B4 says that the Hessian of the demand system has a dominant diagonal, which is a standard assumption invoked to guarantee uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 or Vives, 1999) . B2(iii) and B4 hold that own e¤ects of price changes dominate cross e¤ects, for the level and the slope of demand, respectively.
The following proposition provides su¢ cient conditions for Assumptions A1-A5 and A1' -A5'
to hold in this framework.
Proposition 9 Under Assumptions B1-B4, (a) The Bertrand game is of strict strategic complements, and has a unique Bertrand equilibrium.
(b) Firm i's equilibrium price p i is increasing in c j for any j:
(c) Firm i's equilibrium pro…t i is di¤ erentiable in c i and c j for any j 6 = i:
In addition, if the game is symmetric, then (e) the unique Bertrand equilibrium is symmetric.
(f ) the equilibrium price increases in c:
(g) per-…rm equilibrium pro…t i is di¤ erentiable in c, and decreasing in c.
Proof. See Appendix. We leave to the reader the task of matching the di¤erent parts of Proposition 9 to Assumptions A1-A5 and A1' -A5' , as this step is quite similar to the Cournot case. Note here that in order to …t Assumptions A1-A5 and A1'-A5', one needs to assume a symmetric form of product di¤erentiation, as is often done in the literature.
Anderson, DePalma and Kreider (2001) extends the analysis of the e¤ects of taxation to Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products, and report analogous …ndings as in the Cournot case. Since
Proposition 9 contains only intuitive results on the e¤ects of cost changes on pro…ts, one concludes that the standard assumptions for existence and uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium preclude any counter-intuitive e¤ects of exogenous cost increases.
Proposition 10 Under Assumptions B1-B4, Condition (7) is veri…ed.
Proof. See Appendix. As can be seen from the proof, this result only requires that each …rm's equilibrium price increases with a unilateral unit cost increase, which holds in Bertrand oligopoly with linear costs whenever the game is supermodular (i.e, B3 holds). This result also provides a lower bound on the e¤ect of a unilateral cost increase on industry pro…ts, an issue not considered in the related literature.
We can then conclude that under the general assumptions B1-B4, the holder of a weak patent prefers to license it out using a per-unit royalty licensing contract, both for the cases of an industry insider and outsider.
Uncertain patents of any strength
Our analysis has focused so far on "su¢ ciently weak" patents. One might wonder how weak patents need to be for our results to hold and, relatedly, whether there exists a critical value of patent strength below (above) which a patent holder …nds it optimal to use a per-unit royalty (…xed fee)
contract. To provide insights into these issues, we investigate in what follows the optimal licensing mechanism for uncertain patents of any strength 2 ]0; 1[ considering in turn (i) a setting with the general form of competition described in Section 2 and "su¢ ciently small" innovations, (ii) a setting where the competition between the potential licensees is intense, and (iii) a linear Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous products.
Licensing uncertain patents covering small innovations
In this subsection we consider the general setting described in Section 2 and characterize the optimal mechanism for the licensing of small innovations 21 for any value of the patent strength, as long as deterring litigation is optimal. For the sake of simplicity we will assume that the litigation deterrence constraint is binding for the optimal per-unit royalty license deterring litigation, for any 2 ]0; 1[ (this has been shown to hold for su¢ ciently low values of in Proposition 3). In others words, when using a royalty contract, the licensor …nds it optimal to ask for the maximum per-unit royalty r( ) that deters litigation. 22 Proposition 11 (i) If Proof. See Appendix. This proposition shows that the strategic e¤ect of an increase in all the licensees'marginal cost on their pro…ts, i.e. @ e @c (n; c) + q e (n; c), is still driving the choice of the licensing mechanism when we extend the analysis to patents of any strength covering small innovations. 23 However, in contrast to the analysis focusing on su¢ ciently weak patents, what matters now is the magnitude of this strategic e¤ect and not merely its sign. 24 If that magnitude is su¢ ciently large, in the sense that @ e @c (n; c) + q e (n; c) @ i @c (n 1; c), then the per-unit royalty mechanism is preferred over the …xed fee mechanism whatever the patent's strength (as long as deterring litigation is optimal to the patent holder). However, if it is moderate, in the sense that @ e @c (n; c) + q e (n; c) < @ i @c (n 1; c), then the optimal licensing scheme depends on the patent's strength: there exists a threshold~ , which is increasing in the magnitude of the strategic e¤ect, such that patents whose strength is lower than~ are licensed by means of per-unit royalties while those whose strength is higher than~ are licensed 2 1 Many empirical studies conclude that the distribution of patent values is highly rightward-skewed (see e.g. Lanjouw et al., 1996) which suggests that the majority of innovations are indeed "small".
2 2 Note that under the usual setting of Cournot competition with homegeneous products and linear demand, this holds whenever the innovation size is not too large, which is consistent with our focus on small innovations in this subsection.
2 3 As we have already established that this strategic e¤ect is positive in the standard oligopoly models with broad generality (see Section 6), we excluded from the proposition the (very unlikely) scenario where this e¤ect would be negative. Note however that it is straightforward to include it.
2 4 More precisely, what matters is the relative magnitude of this strategic e¤ect with respect to the marginal loss a …rm would incur if all its rivals'marginal costs uniformly fall, i.e. the ratio @ e @c (n; c)+q e (n; c)
by means of …xed fees. Therefore, the lower the patent's strength the higher the propensity to use per-unit royalties. Moreover, the lower the magnitude of the identi…ed strategic e¤ect, the more likely the holder of an uncertain patent will license it using a per-unit royalty contract.
Licensing uncertain patents when competition is intense
In this subsection, we show that the licensor of an uncertain patent will …nd it optimal to use a per-unit royalty contract whenever competition between the potential licensees is intense enough to drive an unsucessful challenger out of the market, and a global condition on the strategic e¤ect of a cost variation on equilibrium pro…ts holds. We then esatblish that the latter condition, while being more restrictive than Condition (3), is satis…ed under Cournot competition with homogeneous products and Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products under the same general conditions considered in Section 6, whenever the innovation size is not too large in a sense that we specify.
We consider again the general setting described in Section 2 and assume that the litigation deterrence constraint is binding for the optimal per-unit royalty license deterring litigation, for any 2 ]0; 1[. It follows from Section 4 that:
The …rst term between brackets is positive if the following condition, which is a global version of the local Condition (3), holds :
e (n; c 0 ) e (n; c) > (c 0 c)q e (n; c 0 ) for any c; c 0 2 [ c ; c] such that c < c 0 .
In what follows we argue that the second term between brackets in (8) is zero if competition is intense enough, which will ensure that the per-unit royalty scheme is optimal from the patent holder's perspective whenever the competitive environment is such that Condition (9) ( ). For any , let ( ) be the unique value of such that c + r ( ) =c ( ). Then, from (i) it follows that for any 2 0; ( ) , it holds that i (n 1; c + r ( )) = 0 and, a fortiori, i (n 1; c ) = 0. Moreover, using (ii) we get that ( ) is increasing in and ( ) ! 1 as ! 1.
We can therefore state the following:
Proposition 12 If Condition (9) holds then there exists a level of competition intensity < 1 and a threshold ( ) increasing in such that, for any 2 [ ; 1[, the licensor of a patent of strength 2 0; ( ) prefers to use a per-unit royalty contract. Moreover ( ) ! 1 as ! 1:
Alternatively, this proposition can be formulated as follows: If Condition (9) is satis…ed, then for any patent strength value 2 [0; 1[ the licensor will …nd it optimal to use a per-unit royalty contract if the intensity of competition is above some threshold~ ( ) which is increasing in and goes to 1 when goes to 1. It is therefore crucial to assess the generality of Condition (9). Note …rst that it implies the local Condition (3) (while the converse does not hold) and that the interpretations for the two conditions are very close. Rewritting (9) as e (n; c) e (n; c 0 ) < (c 0 c)q e (n; c 0 ) for any c; c 0 2 [ c ; c] such that c < c 0 shows that it means the following: the strategic e¤ect of a decrease in the common marginal cost (from c 0 to c) on pro…ts is negative. 25
In the next proposition we provide su¢ cient conditions of a general nature for Condition (9) to hold under Cournot competition with homogeneous products and Bertrand competition with (symmetrically) di¤erentiated products.
Proposition 13 (i) Consider the Cournot setting with homogeneous products described in Section 6.1 and assume that assumptions C1-C3 hold. Denote Q e (n; c) the industry equilibrium output when all …rms produce at marginal cost c and Q m (c) the monopoly output with marginal cost c:Then Condition (9) holds whenever Q m ( c ) Q e (n; c).
(ii) Consider the symmetric version of the Bertrand setting described in Section 6.2 and assume that assumptions B1-B4 hold. Denote p e (n; c) the equilibrium price when all …rms produce at marginal cost c and p m (c) the (multi-product) monopoly price with marginal cost c for all products:Then Condition (9) holds whenever p e (n; c) p m ( c ).
Proof. See Appendix. In the Cournot setting, it can be easily shown that Q m ( c) < Q e (n; c) and that the monopoly output Q m (c) is decreasing in c, which allows to interpret the condition Q m ( c ) Q e (n; c) as being not too large. To get a sense of how restrictive this condition is, consider the special case of a linear inverse demand p = a Q. Then Q m ( c ) Q e (n; c) if and only if n 1 n+1 (a c). To see why this condition is not very restrictive, note that in this particular setting an innovation is drastic if (a c) : Considering now the Bertrand setting, it is straighforward that the condition p e (n; c) p m ( c ) may also be interpreted as being not too large (for a given level of product di¤erentiation). Alternatively, it could be interpreted as product di¤erentiation being su¢ ciently low (for a given innovation size ).
2 5 Note that Condition (3) could also be interpreted in this way as the strategic e¤ect of a local decrease in marginal costs @ e @c (n; c) + q e (n; c) is exactly the opposite of the strategic e¤ect of an increase in marginal cost. However, this does not hold when we consider global conditions such that (9): the strategic e¤ect of an increase in marginal costs (from c to c 0 ) is e (n; c 0 ) + (c 0 c)q e (n; c) e (n; c) while the strategic e¤ect of a decrease in marginal costs (from c 0 to c) is e (n; c) (c 0 c)q e (n; c) e (n; c 0 ):
Licensing uncertain patents to Cournot competitors
In this subsection, we consider the special case of Cournot competition with linear demand p = a Q and o¤er a complete characterization of the comparison between per-unit royalties and …xed fees for probabilistic patents of any strength covering innovations such that a c 2(n 1) . The latter condition implies in particular that i (n 1; c ) > 0, i.e. that a challenger would always remain active should the patent be upheld 26 (in constrast to the scenario we focused on in Subsection 7.2). We …rst establish that there is a unique threshold patent strength below which per-unit royalties dominate and above which …xed fees are preferred, and then show that this threshold patent strength is signi…cantly high for a large set of parameters. This will complement our …nding in Subsection 7.2. by proving that even in settings where competition is su¢ ciently moderate to allow an unsucessful challenger to remain active, the range of patent strength values for which the per-unit royalty mechanism is preferred by the licensor can be substantially wide.
Standard computations show that the relevant equilibrium pro…ts for the case we consider here are given by e (n; c +r) = (a c + r) 2 (n + 1) 2 ; e (n; c ) = (a c + )
The optimal per-unit royalty r( ) is the unique positive solution in r to the equation
Solving (10) yields
The licensing revenue generated by the optimal per unit royalty contract is given by:
The optimal …xed fee F ( ) is:
2 6 A weaker condition, i.e. < a c n 1
, is actually su¢ cient to ensure that i (n 1; c ) > 0:
and, therefore, the licensing revenue generated by the optimal …xed fee contract is :
The following proposition fully characterizes the patent holder's optimal licensing mechanism 
Welfare implications
Denote W (k; c) the social welfare, de…ned as the sum of aggregate pro…ts (including the patent holder's) and consumers'surplus, when k n out of the n downstream …rms produce at marginal cost c c, and the remaining n k …rms produce at marginal cost c. Assume that W (k; c) is increasing in the number k of e¢ cient …rms and decreasing in those …rms'marginal cost c. This is a very natural assumption, which holds for instance in the usual settings of Cournot oligopoly and symmetrically di¤erentiated Bertrand oligopoly, both with linear demands.
The literature on ironclad patents shows that the holders of such patents may have incentives to restrict the number of licensees when using …xed fee contracts while they …nd it optimal to license all …rms if they use per-unit royalty contracts (see e.g. Kamien, 1992) : it may hold that k r = n and k F < n where k r (resp. k F ) denotes the number of licensees under the patent holder's optimal perunit royalty (resp. …xed fee) contract. In such a context, a trade-o¤ between the number of licensees and their e¢ ciency exists: it is a priori unclear whether welfare when licensing is made through a per-unit royalty contract, i.e. W (n; c + r ) where r > 0 is the optimal per-unit royalty from the patent holder's perspective, is higher or lower than social welfare when a …xed fee contract is used, i.e. W (k F ; c ). Such ambiguity does not exist in our setting: whenever the patent holder …nds it optimal to deter litigation, all …rms have to be licensed. Therefore, the use of a contract involving the payment of per-unit royalty r > 0 results in a social welfare W (n; c +r), while the use of a …xed fee contract yields a social welfare W (n; c ): It then follows from r > 0 that W (n; c +r) < W (n; c ), which means that the …xed fee scheme is socially superior to the per-unit royalty scheme (and to any two-part tari¤ mechanism involving the payment of a positive per-unit royalty). Thus, whenever the patent holder prefers to o¤er a per-unit royalty contract, which is the case in particular for weak patents, the privately optimal licensing scheme will be socially suboptimal. This highlights a particular channel through which uncertainty over patent validity can be detrimental to society.
Conclusion
The issue of patent quality is one of the most serious problems facing the patent system. Mark Lemley who was arguing some time ago against increasing the resources allocated to the Patent O¢ ce in order to improve the examination of patent applications (Lemley, 2001 ) is now much more concerned about this issue: "Some bad quality patents award legal rights that are far broader than what their relevant inventors actually invented, and they do so with respect to technologies that turn out to be economically signi…cant. Many Internet patents fall into this category. Rarely a month goes by that some unknown patent holder does not surface and claim to be the true inventor of eBay or the …rst to come up with now-familiar concepts like hyperlinking and e-commerce. While some such Internet patents may be valid-someone did invent those things, after all-more often the people asserting the patents actually invented something much more modest. But they persuaded the Patent O¢ ce to give them rights that are broader than what they actually invented, imposing an implicit tax on consumers and thwarting truly innovative companies who do or would pioneer those …elds" (Lemley, 2012) .
One negative consequence of the issuance of weak patents on social welfare stems from the legal costs of patent dispute resolution in court. The use of licensing agreements to deter or settle patent litigation allows to avoid those direct costs but induces another indirect loss in welfare, in particular due to the use of a licensing mechanism which is potentially suboptimal from a social standpoint.
We therefore argue that it is important to get a better understanding of the contracts used for the licensing of technologies covered by dubious patents. In this paper we provide a su¢ cient condition under which the holder of a weak patent prefers to license its technology through a per-unit royalty contract rather than a …xed fee contract and show that this condition is very mild: it holds under general conditions for a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous goods and a Bertrand oligopoly with heterogeneous goods, regardless of whether the patent holder is an outsider or an insider to the industry. A signi…cant di¤erence with respect to the literature on the licensing of ironclad patents is that we get a clear-cut result on the comparison of a patent holder's pro…ts under the two schemes, independently of the type of downstream competition, the degree of di¤erentiation between products and whether the patent holder is active or not in the downstream market, while varying any of these three features can overturn the outcome of the comparison when ironclad patents are considered.
Furthermore, it is shown that society is always harmed by the patent holder's choice of a per-unit royalty contract in our setting. Our analysis therefore suggests that constraining or encouraging the licensors of questionable patents to use …xed-fee contracts may yield welfare gains.
Finally, our model generates some testable predictions that might be worth investigating: First, our results suggest that per-unit royalty licenses should be more prevalent in industries with a signi…cant proportion of …rms holding questionable patents, e.g., industries relying on some new patentable subject matter (biotechnology, software, business methods,...). Second, if the predictions of our model are correct then under the presumption that the EPO is more stringent in checking the patentability standards than the USPTO, the use of per-unit royalties should be less prevalent in the EU than in the US. 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 All …rms accepting the license o¤er is an equilibrium if and only if:
e (n; c + r) i (n 1; c + r) + (1 ) e (n; c ) which can be rewritten as:
g (r; ) e (n; c + r) i (n 1; c + r) (1 ) e (n; c ) 0:
We have g (0; ) = e (n; c ) i (n 1; c ) e (n; c) i (n 1; c ) i (n 1; c) i (n 1; c ) > 0 (by A2 and A5) and g ( ; ) = e (n; c) i (n 1; c)
(1 ) e (n; c ) = (1 ) ( e (n; c) e (n; c )) < 0 (by A2): Combining this with g being continuous (by A1) and strictly decreasing in r (by A3) yields: i/ the existence and uniqueness of a solution in r to the equation g (r; ) = 0 (within the interval [0; [), which we denote by r ( ) ; ii/ the equivalence between te inequalities g (r; ) 0 and r r ( ) :
Proof of Proposition 2
We have already shown (in the main text ) that all …rms deciding to purchase a license at a …xed fee F is an equilibrium of the second stage subgame if and only if:
All …rms but one deciding to purchase a license is an equilibrium of the second stage subgame if the following two conditions hold:
Thus, all …rms but one deciding to purchase a license is an equilibrium if and only if:
Denoting F k , e (k; c ) i (k 1; c ) for each k = 1; 2; ::; n, we can further show that for any k = 1; 2; :::; n 2, a number k of …rms accepting the license o¤er and the other n k …rms not doing so is an equilibrium if and only if:
Moreover, all …rms deciding not to buy a license is an equilibrium if and only if:
If we assume that the sequence (F k ) 1 k n is decreasing, i.e. a …rm's willingness to pay for a license (under ironclad patent protection) decreases with the number of licensees, and that a …rm which is indi¤erent between accepting and refusing the license o¤er buys a license, then for any F 0, there is a unique equilibrium to the second stage subgame up to a permutation of …rms: all the equilibria of the second stage subgame involve the same number of licensees (which allows to de…ne a "demand function" for licenses which is decreasing in the …xed fee F ). However, if (F k ) 1 k n is not decreasing then there might exist some values of F for which there is either no (pure-strategy) equilibrium or multiple equilibria with di¤erent number of licensees.
However, if we focus on small values of and do not care about whether pure-strategy equilibria exist -and which one arises in case they do -if all …rms accepting the license o¤er is not an equilibrium (as in the present paper), then the problem of multiplicity or inexistence of equilibria depicted above does not a¤ect our analysis. The reason is that, to be sure that all …rms accepting a license is the unique equilibrium whenever it is an equilibrium, i.e. whenever F F ( ), we only need the inequality F ( ) F k to hold for any k = 1; 2; :::; n 1, which, given that F ( ) = F n ; is true if is small enough, and more speci…cally if
Proof of Proposition 3 All …rms accepting the payment of a per-unit royalty r is an equilibrium if and only if r r ( ) :
Furthermore, A1 ensures that the licensing revenue function r ! nrq e (n; c + r) is strictly increasing in the neighborhood of 0 (its derivative at r = 0 being q e (n; c ) > 0). Since r ( ) is continuous (by the Implicit Function Theorem) and increasing and r (0) = 0; we can conclude that, for su¢ ciently small, the function nrq e (n; c + r) is increasing over [0; r ( )] and, therefore, the optimal per-unit royalty license accepted by all …rms involves the payment of the royalty rate r ( ), that is, the litigation deterrence constraint is binding.
The optimal …xed fee license deterring litigation maximizes the patent holder's revenues nF under the constraint F F ( ). It is straightforward that solution to this constrained maximization program is F = F ( ) :
Proof of Proposition 4
SinceP r (0) =P F (0) thenP r ( ) >P F ( ) for su¢ ciently small if:
because r (0) = 0: Moreover di¤erentiating at = 0 the equation de…ning r ( ), that is, e (n; c + r ( )) = i (n 1; c + r ( )) + (1 ) e (n; c )
we get:
which yields:
Therefore, (11) is equivalent to:
@c (n; c ) q e (n; c ) > n e (n; c ) i (n 1; c ) which can be rewritten as: @ e @c (n; c ) > q e (n; c ) because i (n 1; c ) e (n; c ) < 0:
Proof of Proposition 5
To prove thatF ( ) = 0 for su¢ ciently small, it is su¢ cient to show that the function h(r; ) = rq e (n; c + r)+ e (n; c +r) i (n 1; c +r) (1 ) e (n; c ) is increasing for su¢ ciently small values of r and (this follows immediately from r (0) = 0 and r ( ) being continuous in ). We have:
Let us now assume that @ e @c (n; c ) > q e (n; c ). We need to distinguish between two cases: -Case 1: 
Proof of Proposition 6
Under the per-unit royalty mechanism, the optimal royalty r I ( ) for su¢ ciently weak patents is the solution in r to the following equation:
and the patent holder's overall pro…t is r ( ) = p (n 1; c + r I ( )) + (n 1) r I ( )q l (n 1; c + r I ( )):
Under the …xed fee mechanism, the optimal fee is given by
and the patent holder's overall pro…t is theñ
which can be rewritten as
because r I (0) = 0: Moreover, di¤erentiating at = 0 the equation de…ning r I ( ), we get r 0 I (0):
which yields
Hence, inequality (12) is equivalent to n (n 2; c ) l (n 1; c )
@ l @c
(n 1; c ) @ p @c (n 1; c ) + (n 1) q l (n; c ) > (n 1) e (n 1; c ) i (n 2; c ) which can be rewritten as
or, equivalently, as
Proof of Proposition 7 (a) This follows from the key slope property that every selection of r i satis…es (see Amir, 1996, and Amir and Lambson, 2000 for details)
(b) We …rst show that q i is continuously di¤erentiable in c i : Viewed as a correspondence in the parameter c i , q i is upper hemi-continuous (or u.h.c.) , as a direct consequence of the well-known property of u.h.c. of the equilibrium correspondence for games with continuous payo¤ functions (jointly in own and rivals' actions), see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990 . Since q i is also singlevalued in c (from part (b)), q i must be a continuous function. Then the fact that q i is continuously di¤erentiable in c i follows from the Implicit Function Theorem applied to the …rst order conditions, and the smoothness of P ( ).
The fact that i is also continuously di¤erentiable in c i follows directly from the fact that q i has that same property for all i.
The proof for the parameter c j ; j 6 = i; follows along the same lines. Adding the n …rst order conditions at the Cournot equilibrium yields
Since the LHS of (14) is strictly decreasing in Q , the increase in …rm i's cost from c i to b c i increases the RHS of (14), which causes the solution to (14) to decrease. In other words, b Q < Q .
We now show that for any …rm j 6 = i, we must have b Q j < Q j . To this end, …rst observe that
For …rm j,
We now show that for …rm i, we must have b Q i > Q i . To this end, …rst observe that since for any j 6 = i, r j is strictly decreasing (cf. (13)) and b
for every …rm j 6 = i. Then since b
To show that i > b i , consider
For the remaining parts, we consider the case of a symmetric Cournot oligopoly (c i = c for all i).
(d) Due to the symmetry of the game, asymmetric equilibria, if any, would come in n-tuples.
Hence, the conclusion follows from part (a) directly.
(e) Let q denote each …rm's equilibrium output. Di¤erentiating the …rst order condition with respect to c; we get: @q @c (n + 1) P 0 (nq ) + nq P " (nq ) = 1:
Using the …rst order condition and C3, it is easy to see that the term in brackets is strictly negative, it follows that @q @c < 0. We now show that per-…rm pro…t decreases in c. Denote the equilibrium variables by q i ; i and Q i when the unit cost is c, and by q 0 i ; 0 i and Q 0 i the same variables when the unit cost is c 0 > c: Di¤erentiating i = q [P (nq ) c] with respect to c yields
by (15).
Clearly, C3 implies that 2P 0 (Q) + QP " (Q) < 0 for all Q, so the numerator in the above fraction is < 0. It is then easy to see that the denominator is also < 0. Hence
Proof of Proposition 8 Let us show that Condition (7) holds (which will imply that both Condition (5) and Condition (6) are satis…ed).
Total di¤erentiation w.r.t. c i in
When c i = c j = c, the latter becomes:
Adding the n …rst order conditions at the Cournot equilibrium yields
Thus,
Moreover, since we have already shown (in the proof of Proposition 6) that
Proof of Proposition 9 First note that for …rm i, charging a price of c i strictly dominates charging any price below c i .
Hence, we restrict attention to the price space [c i ; 1) as the action set for …rm i; i = 1; 2; :::; n. Then the transfomed pro…t function log i (p i ; p i ) is well de…ned.
(a) For the proof that the game with log pro…ts as payo¤s is of strict strategic complements, observe that, due to B3, each payo¤ i (p i ; p i ) satis…es @ 2 log i (p i ; p i )=@p i @p i > 0. Hence, by the strong version of Topkis's Theorem (see Amir, 1996 or Topkis, 1998 p. 79), every selection of r i (p i ) is strictly increasing in p i . It follows directly from the property of strategic complements, via
Tarski's …xed point theorem, that the Bertrand equilibrium set is nonempty. Uniqueness then follows from a well known argument from B4 (for details, see Milgrom and Roberts 1990 , pp. 1271 -1272 , or Vives, 1999 .
(b) To show that the equilibrium price p i is increasing in c i , note that the price game is log-
, and the constraint set [c i ; 1) is clearly ascending in c i . So the conclusion follows from Theorem 7 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) .
The fact that the equilibrium price p i is also increasing in c j for any j 6 = i, follows from a similar argument since @ 2 log i (p i ; p i )=@p i @c j = 0.
(c) We …rst show that every equilibrium price p i is continuously di¤erentiable in c j , for all i and j: Viewed as a correspondence in the parameter c j , p i is u.h.c., by the u.h.c. property of the equilibrium correspondence for games with continuous payo¤ functions (jointly in own and rivals' actions), see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990 . Since p i is also single-valued in c j (from part (i)), p i is a continuous function. Then the fact that p i is continuously di¤erentiable in c j follows from the Implicit Function Theorem. Finally, continuous di¤erentiability of i follows from that of all the
) with respect to c j , for i 6 = j, yields
Using the …rst order condition
> 0 (goods are substitutes) and
(e) When the Bertrand game is symmetric, the unique Bertrand equilibrium must be symmetric, for otherwise equilibria would come in pairs.
(f) The conclusion follows from the same argument as for part (b) in view of the fact that 
Using the Implicit Function Theorem and di¤erentiating the FOC with respect to c yields 0
Hence, using B2 and B4,
We can di¤erentiate = (p c)D i (p ; p ; :::; p ) with respect to c to obtain (18) which yields:
Proof of Proposition 10
Let us show that Condition (7) holds (which will imply that both Condition (5) and Condition (6) are satis…ed).
We have:
We have already shown that Moreover, we have @D j @p k > 0 for any j 6 = k (from B2(ii)). It then follows that:
This proof establishes a result which is more general than Condition (7). We have actually shown that @ @c i (c 1 ; c 2 ; :::; c n ) > q i (c 1 ; c 2 ; :::; c n ) for any (c 1 ; c 2 ; :::; c n ) :
Proof of Proposition 11
In this proof we will explicit in our notations the dependence on :Di¤erentiating with respect to the equation e (n; c + r ( ; )) = i (n 1; c + r ( ; )) + (1 ) e (n; c ) de…ning the optimal royalty rate r ( ; ) deterring litigation, and taking the limit ! 0 we obtain: @ e @c (n; c) 1 + @r @ ( ; 0) = @ i @c (n 1; c) 1 + @r @ ( ; 0) (1 ) @ e @c (n; c)
which yields: @r @ ( ; 0) = Di¤erentiating the patent holder's licensing revenues P r ( ; ) = nr ( ; ) q e (n; c + r ( ; )) with respect to and again taking the limit ! 0, we get: @P r @ ( ; 0) = n @r @ ( ; 0) q e (n; c) = n q e (n; c): @P r @ ( ; 0) > @P F @ ( ; 0) () @ e @c (n; c) > q e (n; c) + @ i @c (n 1; c) () >~ , @ e @c (n; c) + q e (n; c)
Combining this with P r ( ; 0) = 0 = P F ( ; 0) and using the continuity of P r ( ; ) and P F ( ; ), we can state that for any <~ there exists~ > 0 such that for any 2 (0;~ ) the patent holder prefers to o¤er a per-unit royalty contract and for any >~ there exists^ > 0 such that for any 2 (0;^ ) the patent holder prefers to o¤er a …xed fee contract. Note that the latter scenario (i.e. >~ ) can arise for a non-empty set of values of < 1 if and only if~ < 1.
Proof of Proposition 13
(i) Cournot competition with homogeneous products : In that environment, the strategic e¤ect of a decrease in the common marginal cost from c 0 to c on individual pro…ts is:
e (n; c) e (n; c 0 ) (c 0 c)q e (n; c 0 ) = (P (nq e (n; c)) c)q e (n; c) (P (nq e (n; c 0 ) c)q e (n; c 0 ) = 1 n (P (Q e (n; c)) c)Q e (n; c) (P (Q e (n; c 0 ) c)Q e (n; c 0 ) :
We can easily derive from C3, combined with C1, that a monopolist's pro…t (P (Q) c)Q is concave.
Denoting Q m (c) the monopoly output with marginal cost c 27 , it follows that (P (Q) c)Q is decreasing over the interval [Q m (c); Q e (n; c)]. 28 We know from part (e) of Proposition 7 that c < c 0 implies Q e (n; c 0 ) < Q e (n; c). Therefore, the strategic e¤ect e (n; c) e (n; c 0 ) (c 0 c)q e (n; c 0 ) is negative if Q m (c) Q e (n; c 0 ). Thus, for Condition (9) to hold it is su¢ cient to suppose, beside assumptions C1-C3, that Q m ( c ) Q e (n; c). 29 2 7 It is straigtforward to establish the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the monopolist's maximization program under C1-C3.
2 8 The inequality Q m (c) < Q e (n; c) follows from the fact that P 0 (Q)Q + P (Q) is decreasing in Q, combined with P 0 (Q m (c))Q m (c) + P (Q m (c)) = c and P 0 (Q e (n; c))Q e (n; c) + P (Q e (n; c)) = c + n 1 n P 0 (Q e (n; c))Q e (n; c) < c: 2 9 Under Cournot competition with a linear inverse demand P (Q) = a Q, this condition holds whenever n 1 n+1 (a c). To see why this condition is not very restrictive, recall that in this setting an innovation is drastic if (a c) : Moreover, the condition Q m ( c ) Q e (n; c) can be weakened to Q e (n; c ) Q e (n; c ) where Q e (n; c ) is the unique value of Q < Q m ( c ) such that (P (Q) c + )Q = (P (Q e (n; c )) c + )Q e (n; c ).
(ii) Bertrand competition with di¤ erentiated products : Denoting D i (p; p; :::; p) , D(p) and p e (n; c) the (common) equilibrium price when the (common) marginal cost is c, we can rewrite the strategic e¤ect of a decrease in the common marginal cost from c 0 to c on individual pro…ts as follows:
e (n; c) e (n; c 0 ) (c 0 c)q e (n; c 0 ) = (p e (n; c) c) D(p e (n; c)) p e (n; c 0 ) c D(p e (n; c 0 ):
Using B2 and B4 we can easily show that the function (p c)D(p), which can be interpreted as the pro…t that a multi-product monopolist producing the n varieties and selling them at the same price p derives from each variety, is concave. Denoting p m (c) , arg max(p c)D(p), it follows that (p c)D(p)
is increasing over [p e (n; c); p m (c)]. 30 We know from part (f) of Proposition 9 that c < c 0 implies p e (n; c) < p e (n; c 0 ). Therefore, we can state that the strategic e¤ect e (n; c) e (n; c 0 ) (c 0 c)q e (n; c 0 )
is negative if p e (n; c 0 ) p m (c). Thus, for Condition (9) to hold it is su¢ cient to suppose, beside assumptions B1-B4, that p e (n; c) p m ( c ).
Proof of Proposition 14
Step 1: Existence of^
We have P r (1) = n n+1 (a c) and P F (1) = n 2 [2(a c)+ (2 n)]
. It is easily veri…ed that P r (1) < P F (1) () (n 2) < n 1 n (a c). Moreover, n 1 n(n 2) 1 2n 1 = n 2 n+1 n(n 2)(2n 1) > 0: Therefore, P r (1) < P F (1) for any a c 2n 1 . This, combined with the continuity of the function ! P r ( ) P F ( ) and the fact that P r ( ) > P F ( ) for > 0 su¢ ciently small (which holds because the linear demand satis…es C1-C3 and, therefore, Condition (7) is satis…ed), ensures the existence of a value^ such that P r ( ) = P F ( ).
Step 2: Su¢ cient condition for the uniqueness of^ :
Remark: This part of the proof is not speci…c to the linear Cournot model considered in this subsection. It holds in any competitive environment such that A1-A5 hold and @q e @c < 0: To show that there is a unique^ , it is su¢ cient to show that
Now
i¤ r 0 ( ) q e (n; c + r ( )) + r ( ) @q e (n; c + r ( )) @c < e (n; c ) i (n 1; c ) :
Evaluating alongP r ( ) =P F ( ), i.e. nr ( ) q e (n; c + r ( )) = n e (n; c ) i (n 1; c ) ,
(and dropping arguments) yields r 0 ( ) q e + r ( ) @q e @c r 0 ( ) < r ( ) q e The function s( ) = r ( ) r 0 ( ) is such that s(0) = 0 and s 0 ( ) = r 00 ( ) so a su¢ cient condition for s( ) to be non-negative over [0; 1] is that r ( ) is weakly concave over [0; 1].
Step 3: Proof for the (weak) concavity of r ( )
We have So r 00 ( ) has the sign of a c 2(n 1) and r 2 [0; ], it holds that (3n 2) y 2 + (4n 6)y (7n 8) y 7n 8 2 (n 1) 8(n 1) 2(n 1) = 4:
